Cody Richard@ssstrickys

security research & disclosure // 0x00001800 permissions read execute

Reported findings

5 findings reported
01

IPC command exposure

Identified unsafe inter-process command surface between the application’s frontend and backend, allowing unintended command execution across the IPC boundary.

02

Renderer-to-sidecar trust-boundary analysis

Mapped privilege and trust weaknesses across the renderer and Node.js sidecar boundary, revealing paths where the renderer could influence privileged sidecar operations.

03

Fetch-patch credential injection architecture

Uncovered a credential-injection vector in the network fetch-patching layer where attacker-controlled inputs could be smuggled into credentialed requests.

04

Cache key injection — WM-2026-001

Raw user queries in search-gdelt-documents.ts were interpolated directly into Redis cache keys with no length bound and no hashing, enabling cache-key poisoning and key-space exhaustion. Fixed with a 500-char cap and SHA-256 keying.

05

Weak hash collision surface — WM-2026-002

The attacker-controlled ?context= parameter in get-country-intel-brief.ts was hashed with FNV-1a (52-bit, non-cryptographic), creating a practical collision surface for cache poisoning. Replaced with truncated SHA-256 (64-bit).